High severity
Over-permissive IAM policies
Identities, often service accounts, that can do anything in the account because a wildcard or a basic role was easier than a scoped policy.
Updated
What it looks like in each cloud
IAM policies with "Action": "*" on "Resource": "*" attached to users, groups or roles, including the AdministratorAccess managed policy on workloads.
Basic roles (Owner, Editor) bound at the project or folder level, especially to service accounts; default service accounts with Editor.
Owner or Contributor assigned at subscription scope to service principals or managed identities.
Why it matters
Permissions are the fuel for lateral movement. A single compromised workload with administrative rights turns a minor incident into full account takeover, and it is the link in most attack paths that reach data.
How it happens
Developers grant broad rights to get something working and leave them in place. Managed policies are attached because the exact permission set is unknown. Default service accounts ship with Editor.
How to check
Enumerate every policy and role binding, flag wildcard actions and basic roles, and compare granted permissions with the permissions actually used over the last 90 days.
How to fix it
Replace wildcards with the actions the workload needs, scope resources explicitly, move to predefined or custom roles, and use permission-usage data to prune what has not been exercised.
Frameworks that require this
The controls this issue falls under. AKRIBOS reports the finding once and maps it to each framework you have in scope.
CIS Benchmarks
AWS Foundations 1.16 (no policies with full administrative privileges); Google Cloud Foundations 1.x (service account and basic role restrictions); Azure Foundations 1.x (custom roles with limited scope).
SOC 2
CC6.1 (authorisation), CC6.3 (least privilege and role changes).
ISO/IEC 27001
A.5.15 Access control, A.5.18 Access rights, A.8.2 Privileged access rights.
DORA
Art. 9(4)(c) least-privilege access management.
NIS2
Art. 21(2)(i) access control policies.
PCI DSS v4
Req. 7.2 (least privilege), 7.3 (access control system).
NIST CSF 2.0
PR.AA-05 (access permissions managed on least privilege).
BSI C5
IDM (least privilege, privileged access management).
DNB Good Practice Information Security
Logical access management (need-to-have, periodic reviews).
How AKRIBOS handles it
AKRIBOS finds this during a read-only review of every connected account, project and subscription, shows the exact resource and setting behind the finding, and ranks it by the attack path it enables rather than in isolation. The fix is proposed as CLI commands or Terraform for you to review and approve, and the approval is recorded in the audit trail together with the compliance controls it satisfies.
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Read moreAttackers don't wait for your next audit. Neither does AKRIBOS.
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