High severity
Long-lived or unused credentials
Access keys, service account keys and client secrets that never rotate and are no longer needed.
Updated
What it looks like in each cloud
IAM user access keys older than 90 days, keys or passwords unused for 45 days, and users with two active keys.
User-managed service account keys, especially ones older than 90 days, where workload identity or short-lived tokens would do.
App registration client secrets with long or no expiry, and unused service principals with credentials.
Why it matters
Static credentials leak: into repositories, build logs, laptops and old wikis. The longer a key lives, the more places it has been, and an unused key is pure exposure with no benefit.
How it happens
Keys are created for scripts and CI jobs that are later replaced but not cleaned up. Rotation is painful because nobody knows where the key is used, so it never happens.
How to check
Inventory every long-lived credential with its age and last use, and identify which workloads could use roles, workload identity or managed identities instead.
How to fix it
Delete unused credentials, rotate the rest on a schedule, and replace static keys with short-lived credentials wherever the platform supports it.
Frameworks that require this
The controls this issue falls under. AKRIBOS reports the finding once and maps it to each framework you have in scope.
CIS Benchmarks
AWS Foundations 1.12 (credentials unused for 45 days disabled), 1.13 (one active key per user), 1.14 (keys rotated every 90 days); Google Cloud Foundations 1.4 and 1.7 (service account keys); Azure Foundations 1.x (unused accounts and credentials).
SOC 2
CC6.1 (credential management) and CC6.2 (removal of access).
ISO/IEC 27001
A.5.17 Authentication information, A.5.18 Access rights.
DORA
Art. 9(4)(c)–(d) access management and protection of authentication secrets.
NIS2
Art. 21(2)(i) access control, 21(2)(j) authentication.
PCI DSS v4
Req. 8.2.6 (inactive accounts removed), 8.3.9 and 8.6.3 (credential rotation).
NIST CSF 2.0
PR.AA-01 (identities and credentials managed).
BSI C5
IDM (credential lifecycle, deprovisioning).
DNB Good Practice Information Security
Logical access management (joiner-mover-leaver, credential management).
How AKRIBOS handles it
AKRIBOS finds this during a read-only review of every connected account, project and subscription, shows the exact resource and setting behind the finding, and ranks it by the attack path it enables rather than in isolation. The fix is proposed as CLI commands or Terraform for you to review and approve, and the approval is recorded in the audit trail together with the compliance controls it satisfies.
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Read moreAttackers don't wait for your next audit. Neither does AKRIBOS.
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