High severity
Instance metadata without session tokens
Compute instances that answer metadata requests, including their temporary credentials, to any process that can reach the local metadata address.
Updated
What it looks like in each cloud
EC2 instances and launch templates with HttpTokens set to optional, which allows IMDSv1.
Instances exposing the metadata server to workloads that do not need it; requests already require a header, so the risk is lower.
The Azure IMDS already requires a Metadata header; the equivalent risk is a managed identity with broader rights than the workload needs.
Why it matters
IMDSv1 is the classic server-side request forgery path to cloud credentials: a vulnerable web app on the instance can be tricked into fetching the role's keys. Several large breaches started exactly this way.
How it happens
Instances were launched before IMDSv2 existed, or from an AMI or template that does not set the token requirement.
How to check
List every instance and launch template with its metadata options, and flag any that allow version 1.
How to fix it
Require IMDSv2 (HttpTokens: required) on every instance and template, and set the account-level default so new instances inherit it.
Frameworks that require this
The controls this issue falls under. AKRIBOS reports the finding once and maps it to each framework you have in scope.
CIS Benchmarks
AWS Foundations 5.6 (EC2 metadata service requires IMDSv2).
SOC 2
CC6.1 (protection of credentials) and CC7.1 (vulnerability management).
ISO/IEC 27001
A.8.9 Configuration management, A.8.8 Management of technical vulnerabilities.
DORA
Art. 9(4)(c) logical access, 9(4)(f) patches and updates.
NIS2
Art. 21(2)(e) vulnerability handling and secure maintenance.
PCI DSS v4
Req. 2.2 (secure configuration), 6.3 (vulnerabilities addressed).
NIST CSF 2.0
PR.PS-01 (configuration management), PR.PS-02 (software maintained).
BSI C5
OPS (vulnerability and patch management).
DNB Good Practice Information Security
Infrastructure security (hardening); vulnerability management.
How AKRIBOS handles it
AKRIBOS finds this during a read-only review of every connected account, project and subscription, shows the exact resource and setting behind the finding, and ranks it by the attack path it enables rather than in isolation. The fix is proposed as CLI commands or Terraform for you to review and approve, and the approval is recorded in the audit trail together with the compliance controls it satisfies.
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Read moreAttackers don't wait for your next audit. Neither does AKRIBOS.
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