High severity
Trust policies open to any account
Roles or bindings that let identities outside your organisation assume access, often for a vendor integration that was set up too generously.
Updated
What it looks like in each cloud
IAM role trust policies with Principal "*" or a wildcard account, and third-party roles without an ExternalId condition.
IAM bindings granting roles to allUsers, allAuthenticatedUsers or entire domains, and service accounts impersonable from outside the organisation.
Cross-tenant access settings or app consents that grant external applications broad directory or subscription permissions.
Why it matters
A trust policy is an invitation. If it is open to any account, anyone who knows the role name can assume it, and if a vendor role lacks an external ID, a confused-deputy attack can borrow the vendor's access.
How it happens
Integration guides are followed loosely, a wildcard is used while debugging, or the vendor's account ID is unknown at setup time.
How to check
Review every trust relationship and external binding, flag wildcards and missing conditions, and confirm each external principal is still a vendor you use.
How to fix it
Pin trusts to specific account IDs or service accounts, require an ExternalId or equivalent condition for third parties, and remove trusts for integrations you no longer run.
Frameworks that require this
The controls this issue falls under. AKRIBOS reports the finding once and maps it to each framework you have in scope.
CIS Benchmarks
Not covered directly by the Foundations Benchmarks; AKRIBOS reports it as part of the attack-path analysis.
SOC 2
CC6.1 (authorisation) and CC6.3 (access by third parties), CC9.2 (vendor risk).
ISO/IEC 27001
A.5.15 Access control, A.5.19 Information security in supplier relationships, A.8.2 Privileged access rights.
DORA
Art. 9(4)(c) access management, Art. 28 ICT third-party risk.
NIS2
Art. 21(2)(d) supply chain security, 21(2)(i) access control.
PCI DSS v4
Req. 7.2 (least privilege), 8.6 (system and application accounts), 12.8 (third-party service providers).
NIST CSF 2.0
PR.AA-05 (access), GV.SC (supply chain risk management).
BSI C5
SSO (subcontractors and suppliers), IDM (access).
DNB Good Practice Information Security
Outsourcing and cloud; logical access management.
How AKRIBOS handles it
AKRIBOS finds this during a read-only review of every connected account, project and subscription, shows the exact resource and setting behind the finding, and ranks it by the attack path it enables rather than in isolation. The fix is proposed as CLI commands or Terraform for you to review and approve, and the approval is recorded in the audit trail together with the compliance controls it satisfies.
Related issues
Storage bucket open to the internet
CriticalObject storage that anyone can list or read, usually from a permissive ACL, bucket policy or account-wide setting that was never switched on.
Read moreRoot or owner account without MFA
CriticalThe most privileged identity in the account protected by a password alone.
Read moreDatabase reachable from the internet
CriticalA managed database with a public address and a firewall that lets the world in.
Read moreAttackers don't wait for your next audit. Neither does AKRIBOS.
Connect AWS, Google Cloud or Azure and get your first review today.
